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Perspectives on a Torts Course
Anita Bernstein
When the spring term of my six-hour torts course begins, the students and
I have already spent at least forty-two dense hours together, and they have
received grades. Patterns are established; classmates have sorted one another;
my presentation is probably predictable; and students know what they can get
away with. In the 1990-91 academic year, I reassessed this situation, thinking
about my need to stay ascendant and to make the students believe that
another semester of the course would have value. It was to freshen a course
that had become, unavoidably, a bit stale that I devised an addition to the
curriculum, called Perspectives.
Students choose one of five possible focuses: economics, corrective justice,
feminism, libertarianism, or "practicality." They are not to tell me their choice.
They read reserve materials in the library, mainly law review articles on torts
topics, which tell them what the five terms mean and how each perspective can
be employed. During the semester I refer to each perspective in class and
attempt to illustrate each one with examples that arise in the cases we read. On
the final exam, one essay question is devoted to the perspectives: the student
must answer it in the voice of an adherent of the chosen perspective.'
Five seems the right number of perspectives to use. More would be unwieldy, and impossible to weave into a single exam question; fewer would
constrain the students' choices. Originally I had a sixth, critical legal studies. I
dropped it in 1992 because only a few students chose it and because of its
overlap with feminism.
Methods
The Five Perspectives
With the fall semester successfully completed, students are familiar with
libertarianism, feminism, economic analysis, and corrective justice as applied
to torts. Cases in the book I use (Prosser, Wade & Schwartz) 2 and supplementary materials illustrate these perspectives. Libertarianism, for instance, emerges
from Richard A. Epstein's early article on strict liability,3 which I distribute just
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I will be happy to provide a sample question on request.

2.

William L. Prosser et al., Cases and Materials on Torts, 8th ed. (Westbury, N.Y., 1988).

3.

A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
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after we read Vincent v. Lake Erie Transport Co.4 Feminism arises when the class
considers the possibility of drafting a statute that would make sexual harassment a new tort. Economic analysis emerges naturally out of CarrollTowing,5
and I also discuss it with Helling v. Care)P and other negligence cases. For
further economic analysis, the class reads Richard A. Posner's article on
defense of property along with Katko v. Briney.8 I use Palsgrafl to present
Ernest Weinrib's arguments about corrective justice.
The reserve materials build on this base. More Posner is available, and I also
recommend a piece by Saul Levmore. 1° For feminism I have Leslie Bender's
article on torts" and the critique of our casebook by Carl Tobias.1 2 Epstein has
been our official libertarian in the reserve materials, but I also recommend
the work of Randy E. Barnett on contracts.' 3 None of these readings has posed
major problems. Corrective justice is the trickiest to teach via reserve readings,
because so many writers disagree on what it means. Provisionally I have
informed the class that corrective justice is what Weinrib says it is, although I
have also included an article by Catharine Pierce Wells; 14 1 continue to search
the recent literature for different contributions.
"Practicality" is a different sort of category. It offers a place for students who
think they despise theory and ideology. The practicality approach to the exam
problem looks for the commonsense answer, and the fewest problems of
administration and cost. It shares the economist's avoidance of transaction
costs and inefficiency but does withoutjargon or specialized knowledge. I use
the practicality perspective to address two conflicting philosophies that students may espouse. First, I want to say to students that opposition to theory or
ideology is itself a theory and an ideology. For students who feel committed to
a theory or ideology expressed in one of the other perspectives, practicality
reminds them of another point of view, one that advocates common sense.
The practicality reading isJames A. Henderson's article arguing against a duty
15
to rescue.

4.

124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).

5.

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).

6.

519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that ophthalmologists must perform glaucoma tests
even where the cost of the test exceeds the expected cost of harm of falling to perform it).

7.

Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14J.L. & Econ. 201 (1971).

8.

183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).

9.

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

10. Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of
Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va. L. Rev. 879 (1986).
11. A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. Legal Educ. 3 (1988).
12. Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 Golden Gate U. L.
Rev. 495 (1988).
13. A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986).
14. Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification forJury Adjudication, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 2348 (1990).
15. Process Constraints in Tort, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 901 (1982).
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The rescue topic is a useful foil for all of the perspectives. Writers from all
five approaches have considered it. Because the duty to rescue is one of the
first topics of the spring semester, I am able to show students, specifically and
almost immediately, how each of the perspectives can be applied.
Integratingthe Perspectives into the Classroom
After the rescue problem, other torts topics present the class with a chance
to apply the perspectives. I have not found another topic that has been the
subject of distinguished law review writing from all five approaches, but
general problems of doctrine evoke at least a few of them. When perspectives
arise naturally, I say so in class.
For example, we spend a day or so on unborn children: wrongful formation, wrongful life, and fetal injury. A feminist discussion of this topic explores
the tension between women's liberties, a la Roe v. Wade, and the unique
potential of a woman to carry an embryo and a fetus inside her body. But the
feminist issues are obvious, so I ask students what problems of practicality are
raised. For instance, what would make a fetal injury case hard to litigate?
Students come up with problems: but-for causation (including the question
whether the fetus was healthy and unharmed before the injury), measurement
of damages, deciding who is the proper plaintiff.
We talk about the economic efficiency of a contributory negligence rule.
We explore the corrective-justice implications of the presumption, in failureto-warn cases, that a warning -would have been heeded. 6 I ask how a feminist
would approach recovery for consortium and for injuries that result in physical disfigurement. We consider the implicit libertarianism in assumption-ofrisk doctrine. I ask the students to think about the true cost of consumer
product warranties. We talk about problems of proof and litigation strategy
(i.e., practicality) in medical malpractice cases. And I am explicit: 'This is an
illustration of the Xperspective."
Anonymity
Students are instructed to avoid disclosing to me which perspective they
have chosen. This practice is in keeping with the school's effort to keep
examinations anonymous until the instructor has turned in (provisional)
grades. Although more than one student chooses each perspective, any disclosure would increase the chance of losing anonymity.
To protect anonymity while providing a chance to ask questions about the
perspectives, at about the ninth or the tenth week I invite students to give
written questions to avolunteer who collects the little slips of folded-up paper.
A week later, I detain the class for an extra twenty minutes and read the
questions aloud. Only occasionally do I decline to answer a question: if it
comes too close to a valuable future exam question, or repeats another
question, or appears so narrow as to be of little general interest.

16. Professors David Owen and Aaron Twerski brought this question to my attention.

Journalof Legal Education
I have begun to experiment with calling on students to help answer the
questions. Obviously anyone called on might know little about this particular
perspective. But all of the perspectives should be at least somewhat familiar by
then, so occasionally I can turn a question over to the students. Or else I might
ask a student to paraphrase the written question. By speculating about who
could not possibly have posed each question, I try to reduce the 1-in-90 chance
that I will call on the author.
Grading
The spring examination is worth 240 raw-score points: 80 for a multiple
choice section, 80 for a traditional essay, and 80 for the perspectives. I grade
the first two parts first and then contemplate the distribution. In the last two
years the raw-score points for both the multiple-choice and the essay parts
have ranged from about 35 to 72, with medians around 50 or 55. I grade the
perspectives part with the general plan of following the approximate shape of
the other curves.
The preliminary grades for the perspectives answers (before they are converted to fit with these distributions) range from 1 to 7. Each increment on the
1-to-7 scale has a separate classification. I look for mastery of the chosen
perspective, engagement with the facts of the question, anticipation and
refutation of the basic counterarguments, identification of sophisticated arguments beyond the obvious, and good clear prose and respect for the conventions of expository writing. A grade of 1 indicates an answer with no understanding or analysis; a 7, which I have given only once, is saved for an answer
that fulfills all of the criteria. The lowest score I've ever given is a 3.
The middle numbers are used for recurring types of answers. As in conventional exam questions, I often see a good, well-prepared statement of the
perspettive ("the law") combined with a failure to meld that statement with
the facts of the hypothetical. This type of answer cannot go beyond a 5.
Fundamental misstatements about the perspective also cost the student a
couple of points, as does the absence of stated counterarguments that the
student ought to have anticipated. I tend to put a higher value on grappling
with the facts than on a smooth statement of the perspective, as it is a scarcer
skill and more pertinent to advocacy.
Before reading the bluebooks I stack them into five piles, by perspectives,
and I read each one as part of a group of the same persuasion. Informally,
without precision, I compare the answers to others in the group. The result
has been that Ijudge the feminism answers a little more stringently.
The feminism answers make a nice bell-shaped curve, I find, and economics answers are generally either very good or very poor. Corrective justice
mystifies many students, but I have had some good work in that area. Practicality, now that I am better at explaining what I mean by the word, improved a
great deal during the second year: my highest A student in 1992 chose this
perspective.
At the end of the year I find out who chose what. In both years several men
chose feminism (including my 1991 highest A), although, if memory serves,
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no woman has ever chosen libertarianism. The summer after one examination, I had excellent research assistance from two libertarians. Good students
appear to be evenly distributed among the choices.
The Need for Perspectives
My original reasons for adding the perspectives element to the course had
to do with pacing. In addition to the anticlimax of beginning a new semester
after the end of an old one, Torts poses another pacing problem. For many
instructors, a six-hour course is idyllic, because so much can be covered. My
own feelings are mixed. I enjoy the luxury of plenty of time, the chance to get
to know students for a full academic year that is so momentous for them,
and-I confess-the extra attention that students pay to their credit-heavy
courses. But I have never figured out how to manipulate the three-and-three
division of the semesters in a way that does not favor the fall and leave the
spring bereft. Fundamental, compelling concepts-intent, negligence, causation-come first. A miscellany is relegated to the spring: defenses, damages,
defamation, nuisance, products liability. The perspectives component helps
to balance the division.
Though it started with a pacing problem, I now believe that the perspectives element is supported by deeper justifications and pedagogical needs.
Even a five-hour, one-semester course (the soundest way to teach Torts, in my
opinion) would be enhanced by this addition. The perspectives component
has helped me achieve several goals, which I describe below.
Lawyering Skills
The addition of perspectives requires students to choose a persona. They
must understand a particular approach, learn to speak in the appropriate
voice, and recognize the limitations of the approach. This, I believe, is a highly
practical exercise for future lawyers. In sociological jargon, a lawyer takes the
role of the client, adversary, partner, or judge. To be successful in negotiation,
litigation, deal making, and counseling, a lawyer must understand where the
other person is coming from.
Some students bring this skill with them to law school, but for others it can
and should be taught. The Socratic method of instruction, and the immersion
into the first year of law school, convey for new students some of what I
explicitly offer as perspectives. Law students pick up the realist idea that law is
to some degree rhetorical and contingent, that lawyers make arguments
rather than find answers. In the perspectives component, however, I stress
the slightly different concept of having to understand another person's point
of view.
Students of course gravitate to a congenial perspective. Feminists choose
feminism, libertarians favor libertarianism, practical or nonideological students are drawn to practicality. The voice of the "other" is usually not too
alien. But the point about skills training still holds. In the practice of law one
takes the role of the other, but that other is someone with whom one has
something in common. In a corporate acquisition, for instance, a lawyer works
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with a client whose financial needs are understandable and sympathetic, with
an other-side attorney counterpart, and with a team of support players who
share the client's goal. The corporate attorney need not struggle to take the
role of a person accused of bank robbery, or of an elderly testator. Selfselection limits, but does not obviate, the need for role-taking skills.
A related skill to be fostered is the ability to function at the bottom of a
hierarchy. Entry-level work is generally humble, no matter which law school
one has attended. Beginners need to understand others more than these
others need to understand them. The perspectives element of the course may
help to teach humility. Students learn that writers have expressed opinions
more elegantly and persuasively than they are able to; that true insights are
scarce; and that no matter what reaction they will have to the exam question,
they must put on the mask and speak through a slightly different persona. As
an instructor I want to prepare students for the occasional harshness of reallife law practice without being harsh myself-to prepare each student for the
arbitrary senior associate, the backstabbing colleague, or the irascible boss or
judge she will surely encounter, without tolerating arbitrary, backstabbing, or
irascible behavior in my classroom. The perspectives, I hope, convey this
lesson without inflicting pain.
EncouragingInitiative
At the same time that it prepares students for the hierarchy that will weigh
so heavily on them in practice, the perspectives component requires initiative.
Students are responsible for their own choice. This right-and-responsibility is
anomalous: at my school first-year students cannot choose any of their courses
or their instructors. In second-semester Legal Writing they will have an option
or two, but most of their curriculum is dictated from above.
Students choose among the perspectives as they would choose an undergraduate major, except that the choice of perspective entails no formal
commitment. In theory a student can -choose two or more perspectives,
attempt to master them, and then at the examination apply whichever seems
to fit the question best. But I have the impression that most students choose
only one.
This early opportunity to make a choice, I think, presages the ethical and
tactical dilemmas that students will confront later in their careers. The perspectives component points up the connection between an intellectual choice
and real-life consequences-between "theory and practice," as the academic
clich6 goes. Students can control a small fraction of their torts course, just as
they will control a small fraction of their careers.
Continuinga LiberalEducation
Most students arrive at law school with an incomplete liberal arts education.
They have read little, and written less. Some of them, I can tell by their faces,
were never challenged by a teacher until their encounter with me. They seem
aware that their liberal education has been scant, but they are uncertain
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whether they ought to want more, and most do not expect law school to
complete their education.
For my part, I believe that legal education cannot be justified as an entirely
vocational enterprise. The ranks of practicing lawyers cannot accommodate
replacement at the rate that law schools produce graduates. One need not
subscribe to the pernicious slogan that the United States cultivates "too many
lawyers" to agree that there isn't work available in the practice of law for
everyone, and that some talented law school graduates lack the temperament
for practice.
That last paragraph states in negative terms a justification for educating
thousands of new lawyers: law school gives students the extra time and depth
to learn as they would have learned, perhaps, in college forty years ago. Most
of my students proceeded mechanically to college in September after high
school graduation in June, without question and without much thought.
Regional law schools in particular admit many students who did not "focus,"
or "concentrate," as some of them put it, "until it was too late." Law school
permits their liberal education to begin again.
Instructors usually fulfill this educational responsibility by leavening the
presentation of rules or doctrine with more abstract material, class discussion,
or alternative teaching techniques. The perspectives component is a species of
this kind of course supplement, but it goes further than other techniques.
Reading books and articles on reserve in the library, thinking about disciplines or approaches that are independent of law, and writing an essay on the
spring exam are familiar experiences that unify college and law school, and
place law in the context of the liberal arts, so that students can appreciate the
concept of legal education beyond vocationalism.
PoliticalIssues
What about the politics of torts, or any other course? The dilemma is
familiar. American law developed in a political, historical, and social setting.
To ignore or deny this setting is to mislead students and tell lies; to overemphasize it (particularly if one is, say, a youngish female Jewish liberal feminist
and therefore an atypical sort of law professor) is to provoke student resistance and alienation. Especially because I teach at a regional school, I want to
make my students feel that they are in the mainstream, that they are getting a
legal education as real as anyone's and not some eccentric political fantasy.
If the first fork in the road is the decision either to acknowledge the
relationship between law and politics or to pretend that none exists, the
next question-if one decides to acknowledge the relationship-is what to
say about it. Here the perspectives component plays a role that other
course supplements cannot because, within limits, students find the answer
themselves.
The perspectives are lurking in the library, and some of them differ from
my occasional expression of my own political views. Students learn that I am a
feminist of the equal-treatment persuasion; that I find relevant the academic
debate about tort law as nineteenth-century subsidy; that I do not focus on the
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goals of compensation and deterrence. Thus my priorities and opinions are,
as we say, "in the air, so to speak. " 17 But they are contradicted and shaded and
refuted in official course materials.
Supportinga Course CalledJustice
In the fall before I began using the perspectives component, my school
added a new required course to the first-year curriculum, called Justice and
the Legal System. Each section of the course used the same materials in 1990,
and a common core has been established. The Justice course begins with
analytical legal philosophy-Hart, Fuller, Dworkin-and moves through other
topics that explore the relationship between justice and law.
Each of the Justice instructors (I've taught it twice) has reflected on what
this course has to offer. One of my colle agues, Richard Wright, has justified it
as follows. Students, he says, begin law school as formalists. They start off
believing that they can learn all of the law from hornbooks, commercial
outlines, and yellow-highlighter-marked passages in cases. But quickly they
become extreme legal realists, perhaps nihilists, who think that the law is
what the powerful had for breakfast. No right answers, and no reason to care
about right answers. The Justice course, by presenting jurisprudential arguments between these extremes (the modified positivism of H. L. A. Hart,
critical theory, pragmatism, and what Wright calls "principlism," among others) shows students how much more there is to law than these two facile
conclusions.
The existence of the Justice course, and this justification for it, influenced
my use of the perspectives component. I wanted to support and reinforce a
part of the curriculum that is occasionally challenged. Rather than reduce the
jurisprudential content of my torts course on the ground that it's covered
elsewhere, I increased it. And Wright's justification to me seems worth keeping in mind while teaching any law course. The truth about law really does lie
between formalism and nihilism, and instructors ought to keep this middle
region apparent to students.
As with political issues, in my support of the Justice course I acknowledge
both my own views and the existence of different ones. Obviously the message
that "perspectives" shape legal decision-making is a realist one. But the law
and economics approach, when used normatively, goes the other way; and the
correctivejustice perspective also cuts against legal realism. (It is a pleasure, by
the way, to be able to refer casually to positivism or Ronald Dworkin or Karl
Llewellyn in a first-year course! At a minimum the students know that they
should know what I mean.)
Supplementing a Casebook
The Prosser, Wade & Schwartz casebook is built around heavily edited
cases, with short notes following. The brevity of the material, and traces of
Prosser's distinctive wit, give the book a degree of charm. My students have

17. Palsgrafv. Long Island RR, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
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liked it, and I am grateful for the way it seems to keep in mind both their
ignorance and their desire to learn.
But this simplicity begins to seem a little simple-minded after a semester.
For the advanced topics the book does include some textual material (which I
happen to find unhelpftll and inaccurate), yet its presentation stays flat
against the students' steep learning curve. My class outgrows the book by
January and needs a new challenge.
In a world without costs, I could switch casebooks for the spring semester.
Other accommodations might work: supplemental handouts, a stepped-up
pace, additional demands on the students. But I think that something like the
perspectives component is the supplement that best fills the gaps of Prosser,
Wade & Schwartz. Whereas the book tends toward formalism, the perspectives
tend toward legal realism. The book, especially after the arrival of Victor
Schwartz, is politically conservative, and arguably gender-biased; the perspectives element adds a range of political views that includes feminism. The book
presents torts as orderly and stable; the perspectives say no.
Assessment
In addition to the above.justifications for adding the study of perspectives
to a torts course, I have noticed that the addition offers some practical
benefits. Follow-up with students suggests that their reaction to the perspectives is mixed, though mainly positive. Aside from student complaints, which
are not common, I am aware of other drawbacks, mainly the consumption of
time and some flaws of administration.
Student Comments
I urge students to tell me their thoughts about the perspectives component
of the course when I run into them during the summer or the following fall.
Their comments are generally positive. Some of them have said that they have
no particular expertise in pedagogy and "it's too soon" for them to tell
whether they benefited.
Students have complained that early in the spring semester the perspectives component is frustratingly elusive and vague. "We didn't know what you
expected," several have said to me, although I distinctly remember hearing
this complaint before I added the perspectives to my course, and my colleagues hear it too. I heard it much less during the second your of perspectives,
after I refined my explanations.
The anonymous questions are also a source of student feedback. About half
have been procedural and not specific to a'particular perspective, suggesting
to me that I have not been clear in telling students that they are to use this
extra session to ask about their chosen perspectives: questions that do not
compromise anonymous grading should be asked openly. But many of the
inquiries are specific, and a couple have been shrewd: I am grateful to the
unidentified student who asked me to distinguish the economics and practicality perspectives-a question that clarified my own thinking. The questions
give me an idea, midsemester, how well students are catching on to the
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perspectives generally, and which areas need more explication. And the
recurrent "Could you give an example ofwhat you want?" assures me that I will
stay in touch with persistent first-year anxiety. Old exam questions on reserve,
with sample answers, give my students some comfort and guidance.
Advantages
The perspectives have cured my pacing problem. Students appear refreshed by the addition of something new. Perplexed and uneasy too-but
they seem to understand that another semester of lesser topics would take
away some of the challenge they had enjoyed in the beginning of the year.
At my school we follow a mandatory curve for first-year grades, and all
instructors face the problem of discouragement among students who have
landed in the facetiously labeled bottom ninety percent. This problem is
especially acute in the full-year courses where the student must go on with the
same instructor and the same group after receiving a disappointing firstsemester grade. Although many students take mediocre grades with good
grace, resolving to try harder or feeling grateful that the outcome wasn't
worse, the more common response is withdrawal.
With the arrival of the perspectives element, however, students who have
fallen short of their expectations on the traditional issue-spotting fall exam get
a new venue. Even students who purport not to be interested in anything
other than doctrine are usually willing to try again with the perspectives, if
only because their enthusiasm for doctrine did not serve them well on the
more doctrinal midyear exam. Not everyone is reached, of course, but I think
that with the addition of perspectives I have achieved about as much participation and engagement in the spring semester as possible.
Grading the exams, I've observed with pleasure how the perspectives component gives students a different way to express themselves and what they have
learned. The hierarchy shifts. Some students who are weak at issue spotting
write mordant, cut-to-the-heart perspectives essays. Sometimes a student's
tendency toward insolence, which can be concealed in more conventional
exam writing, is revealed in the perspectives answer. This difference seems to
me a good thing, although it perhaps confirms the criticism that the perspectives component is alien to the rest of the course.
I have been pleased also with the degree of understanding of the perspectives that the students reveal in their exam answers, although that understanding is not especially deep. Because the reserve materials present the perspectives in a pluralistic way, with various authors disagreeing about the content of
feminism, economic analysis, libertarianism, and (especially) corrective justice, and because the practicality alternative is hard to grasp, I find that
students usually resort to a common-denominator approach. Some of them
appear to have memorized a few key phrases and learned little else about the
perspective. But I have almost no quarrel with this strategy: I am not, after all,
teaching undergraduate economics, or philosophy, or women's studies. Complete immersion is not necessary. The skill I am trying to teach is the merger of
law and "life"-other ideas, past experience, and exogenous theory applied to
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legal reasoning. For my purposes, the students learn their chosen perspectives
well enough.
Disadvantages
Drafting one question which can be answered from five points ofview-and
which is equally fair to all students no matter which perspective they have
chosen-is quite a challenge to my imagination. I hoard ideas for questions.
No free samples. The pool of potential questions could expand, I suppose, ifI
were to allow myself the option of giving the students a case excerpt with the
one-word instruction to "comment" (a version of an exam I once took as a law
student). It may come to this.
The feminism perspective is something of a nuisance. More than any other,
it narrows the range of problems I can test on. We have to have a woman in the
question, as I do not regard feminism as a complete world view with lessons for
situations that do not involve women. Feminism is also by far the most popular
choice, and it would make my grading simpler if each perspective drew onefifth of the students. I can't drop it, but I can't figure out a way to reduce
the extra work it creates-except to announce in class that I know the feminist perspective is popular and all answers are curved internally to determine
a grade.
Adding anything to a course reduces other opportunities. I find I have little
time for the occasional role-playing exercises that students enjoy in the fall. If
I were to drop perspectives I would have room for another topic-perhaps
business torts, compensation schemes, or invasion of privacy. I can't test on as
many topics on the exam (although multiple-choice questions, which I use
only on the spring exam, do much of that work), and I have to spend time
monitoring the availability of reserve materials, updating those materials, and
preparing answers to the anonymous questions.
The anonymous questions are an unsatisfactory way to deal with the problems students have in grasping their chosen perspective. They can't follow up
with another question when my answer is inadequate, and sometimes they do
not express their questions clearly, so I end up answering something that was
never asked. My attempts to cure this problem have included a second anonymous Q&-A session and more explicit lecturing about each perspective in class.
Sometimes when I read an anonymous question and I am not sure I understand it, I call on a student at random and ask, "What does this question mean
to you? Can you rephrase it?;' Volunteers usually emerge then, and, as I
mentioned, sometimes I ask them to answer the question.
I could abandon anonymity, I suppose, without violating the school's policy
of blind grading, because more than one student chooses each perspective.
But I am known in my school for having a sharp memory for handwriting, such
that I can occasionally identify students' bluebooks while grading in May,
having seen their handwriting once before in December. It wouldn't do
student morale any good for me to relax my vigilance on anonymity. I am still
working on the problem.
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Conclusion

The perspectives component has added depth and challenge to my yearlong torts course without provoking significant student resistance. Because of
the satisfaction it has given me as an instructor, I will go out on the following
limb: I think every five- or six-hour torts course should include something like
the perspectives addition. The costs/benefits tradeoff might balance in the
other direction when the instructor has fewer hours to cover basic material.
But even a three- or four-hour course would be impoverished, I believe,
without attention to some of what the perspectives can achieve.
The most obvious contribution of perspectives is their substance-students
can learn a little economics, feminism, libertarianism, or corrective justice
along with doctrine. But in my course this contribution is secondary. I use
perspectives mainly to keep students learning throughout a long year, and to
teach them skills that I think will make them better lawyers. The perspectives
element can enhance their self-confidence, their humility, their ability to take
the role of another-and I think even their very lives, as they learn that
what they know from outside law school bears on their study and application
of the law.
Accordingly, in this paper I have presented my assessment of the perspectives component in modular blocks. I have devised this curricular addition to
fit my own goals, strengths, weaknesses, political views, and beliefs about legal
education; and I have tried to be candid about the many ways that this
teaching technique is personal. The reader can decide what seems right and
what doesn't. I hope that either the ends or the means that I have described
will provoke interest.

